



The Multi-State Fleet Response Initiative Working Group Workshop Report

Rapid Critical Infrastructure Restoration Through Joint Integrated Planning For the Movement of Private Sector Resources in Response to

Hurricane Sandy

January 30, 2013
Philadelphia, PA

In Partnership with:

Bank of America | Commonwealth of Pennsylvania | Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) | PECO Energy | Pepco Holdings Inc. | State of New Jersey | U.S. Department of Energy | U.S. Department of Homeland Security – Infrastructure Protection | Verizon





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On January 30, 2013, All Hazards Consortium (AHC) in partnership with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the State of New Jersey, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security - Infrastructure Protection (DHS-IP), held a workshop of the Multi-State Fleet Response Initiative Working Group. There was participation from 75 people including:



- State/local government emergency management, homeland security & transportation
- State/local energy & energy regulatory personnel
- Private sector representatives from multiple sectors including electric, gas/oil, finance, telecommunications, food, transportation, and water
- Non-profit associations in energy sector (EEI, API, Fuels Merchants Association)
- US Department of Homeland Security, Infrastructure Protection
- FEMA
- US Department of Energy
- US Department of Transportation

The objective of the workshop was to assess lessons learned from Super Storm SANDY and identify opportunities for improving movement of fleets in response to emergency events.

Tom Moran of AHC explained that workshop discussions should result in two to four specific action items for the working group to address for improving multi-state fleet response and the movement of private sector resources across state lines. In addition, the workshop should be used as an opportunity to establish contacts and relationships that will provide useful during an emergency event.

As part of the workshop, the US Department of Energy (DOE) held an Energy Roundtable on the impacts of SANDY on the Energy Sector, fuel availability in particular. The objective of the Roundtable was to identify lessons learned and opportunities for improvement regarding energy supply disruptions and planning to improve energy infrastructure resilience.

For more information see information link:
<http://www.ahcusa.org/Multi-StateFleetResponseInitiative.htm>

I. OVERVIEW AND PROGRESS TO DATE

Joe Picciano of the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness welcomed workshop participants by emphasizing that the private sector response to Super Storm SANDY was a success. The storm caused unprecedented damage and heavily impacted areas are still facing significant reconstruction and restoration. However, the private sector, in several areas was able to implement response and recovery successfully.

Jim Caverly, formerly of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security - Infrastructure Protection, highlighted the challenges facing fleets required to cross state lines to support emergency response efforts such as SANDY.

- Fleet responders from out-of-state are sometimes delayed at weigh stations or on toll roads in pass through states as they travel to impacted states.
- Permitting and other requirements for inter/intrastate movement of fleets varies from state-to-state, are not always well known, and often not communicated sufficiently to private sector crews.
- There is a need to identify additional methods for facilitating private sector fleet and resource movements efficiently and in compliance with state and federal requirements.
- Many people are not aware of the various existing resources and solutions already in place (e.g. "511" telephone based system to provide information on road status). These need to be catalogued.



I. OVERVIEW AND PROGRESS TO DATE, Cont.

The Multi-State Fleet Working Group is developing a multi-state informational database (initially for a few states) to be used in facilitating faster movement of fleet vehicles. This will help to expedite fleet movements so response is quicker while still maintaining compliance with state and federal requirements.

John Shaner of PHI, Inc. (PEPCO Holdings Inc.) gave a presentation on understanding the private sector position on the Multi-State Fleet Response Initiative. Working groups like the Multi-State Fleet Response group are needed to facilitate the honest and open dialog between the operations people in government and the private sector operators, particularly the regulated companies who have regional and national operations. Having the AHC facilitate and convene this workshop is important and we appreciate the AHC providing this service.

There is a need for education in government and the private sector on how each other plan and respond to emergencies. Understanding each other's needs will help us work together on the next disaster in a more efficient manner. Within the electric sector, there are some examples that I think could help build a common understanding and manage expectations of the electric sector.

Such Examples Are:

- The pace (or speed) of repair for infrastructure such as poles or line repair cannot be improved due to the physical and safety requirements associated with those repairs. The best method for quickening the pace of restoration is to improve the ability to move the material, personnel and other resources needed for repair to the affected area faster. **Remember...A delay of two to four in fleet movements can delay restoration by 24 to 48 hours.**
- There is a need for increased transparency and better communication between the public and private sectors. Private sector does not have a strong understanding of public sector response activities, decision making, and information requirements. Similarly, many in the public sector do not have a strong understanding of mutual assistance arrangements in the private sector, or the requirements for moving fleets, resources and vehicles involved in response.
- The word "fleets" can include but are not limited to electricity, fuel, food, water, catering for responders, public safety, and equipment needed for restoration.



I. OVERVIEW AND PROGRESS TO DATE, Cont.

Specific opportunities for improvement include:

Near Term:

- In the near term, both the public and private sectors need to increase their understanding of the requirements for movement of fleets across state lines.
- Fleet operators need to obtain proper documentation, develop contact lists, and use notification processes. Public-private efforts across states need to be better coordinated.
- Other near term solutions for facilitating interstate movement could include obtaining EZ Pass and register the license plates for response fleets. Potentially, an EZ Pass account can be created to pay tolls. The account can be established in advanced so it will be ready to implement during the pre-event stage or immediately following an emergency declaration. This is a regional solution, however, and needs to lead to a longer term solution that is nationwide.
- In addition, utility drivers can be provided a letter of intent to show law enforcement for interstate movements. This can be useful for vehicles without utility company emblems.
- More communication and coordination by State Emergency Management Agencies (EMAs) across neighboring States is needed. Increased coordination will be critical to facilitate interstate movement. For example, EMAs should work with the lifeline sectors (electricity, communications, fuel, water, food, etc...) and improve information sharing and coordination with those sectors.

- Some forms of interstate vehicle movements appear to be effective. For example, public safety vehicles (i.e. ambulances) and trucks containing radiological material move across state lines smoothly. These should be evaluated as models to use in the energy sector.

Mid-Term

- In the mid-term the causes of long delays (weigh stations, tolls, etc..) need to be addressed to develop sustainable methods and best practices for reducing those delays.
- Improvements can be made to the 511 system to increase access and improve quality of road closure information.
- New methods of communication (i.e. Facebook, Twitter, and other social media sites) need to be evaluated for improving information sharing.

Long-Term

- Over the long term, methods for improving fleet movement need to be made consistent across regions (multi-states) and individual states. State Departments of Transportation and EMAs can work with the private sector to develop standardized rules for response efforts.



II. SUPPORTING PARTNERSHIPS AND RESOURCES

Cherrie Black of the State, Local, Tribal and Territorial Government Coordinating Council (SLTTGCC), and Steve Emanuel, Chief, New Jersey Office of Information Technology spoke on partnerships to facilitate inter-state movement of vehicle fleets during emergency response.

The SLTTGCC works with DHS Infrastructure Protection and other federal agencies involved in infrastructure protection to provide cross-jurisdictional government coordination..

Ms. Black highlighted the importance of cross-jurisdictional coordination as well as better coordination between the federal, state and local government. She pointed to DOE activities to increase energy assurance and improve coordination with state energy offices and utility commissions. It is participating in a regional initiative to understand how infrastructure protection is conducted in each state and to develop a regional approach for improving infrastructure protection and resilience. SLTTGCC has 40 members located in most states across the U.S. This network of government coordinators could be a useful partner to the Multi-State Fleet Response Working Group for in improving coordination across state lines on both the regional and national level.

Steve Emanuel, Chief, New Jersey Office of Information Technology discussed the opportunities of leveraging the resources and capabilities of

information technology (IT) departments within both private sector and public sector organizations to assist in emergency response. During SuperStorm SANDY, Steve worked with the Multi-State Fleet Response WG members (e.g. John Shaner PHI, the NJ Turnpike Authority, and AHC staff) to quickly design and implement a work around process with the toll authorities that resulted in moving trucks faster through toll states across several states. Steve plans to work with his CIO colleagues in other states to explore solutions for fleet movement going forward. As this group moves through the maturity model of these solutions, IT will remain a critical component to help develop and implement a solution(s). IT solutions need to be developed in advance of an event, not during the response process. Steve encouraged the group to work with their IT departments to help them understand processes for multi-state fleet movements, the types of data needed and data available. He also recommended working with the National Association of Chief Information Officers (NASCIO).



III. MULTI-STATE FLEET RESPONSE ROUNDTABLE

Moderator:

Dave Gruber, Assistant to Director, New Jersey Office Homeland Security & Preparedness

Panelists:

Scott Smith, Assistant Director, Southeastern Electrical Exchange

Tony Torphy, Director, Electric Operations Emergency Management, Consolidated Edison Company of New York

Mike Ambrosio, VP Quality Assurance Division, Wakefern Foods

Jeffery Dell, Senior VP Global Business Continuity and Recovery/Crisis Management, Bank of America

Paul Truban, Manager, Bureau of Freight Planning & Services, New Jersey Department of Transportation

Melissa Mahar, Critical Infrastructure Protection, New York State Office of Counter Terrorism

Bruce Kuhn, SEOC Coordinator, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency

The objectives for this panel were:

- To develop a shared perspective in order to coordinate future actions on specific issues across multiple sectors;
- To share the activities that take place within the private sector and government in preparation for a major event that are dependent on rapid and unencumbered fleet movement;
- To describe the interactions and dependencies within and between sectors and government that impact coordinated multi-sector response
- To identify problems and proposals for solutions to support rapid and effective private sector fleet and resource movement.

The Multi-state Fleet Response Roundtable addressed lessons learned from SANDY and managing expectations for the movement of resources by the private sector. The Roundtable discussion began by posing the question: “What does the private sector do on “Blue Sky” days to prepare for emergency event?”

Food Industry

Communication across the food sector increases in advance of an event. In addition, companies are transporting generators in advance of the storm and taking other measures to ensure food safety. They are in communication with utility, water companies and trucking companies to determine the projected extent of outages. Distribution centers generally have enough food for four days. Longer outages would require significant work-arounds. A representative from the food industry found the

The purpose of the panel was to explore the impacts of “slowed” private sector resource movement (e.g. utility fleets, food delivery fleets, etc.) and the actions taken by private sector with state and local government in response to the SANDY related critical infrastructure issues (e.g. power outages, fuel shortages, supply chain resilience, etc.) in the lifeline sectors.



III. MULTI-STATE FLEET RESPONSE ROUNDTABLE, Cont.

511 system to have inaccurate information at times. This is problematic for decision makers in the private sector as they depend on accuracy and timeliness of the information provided by the public sector and other organizations involved in response efforts.

Electric Utility Industry

In preparation for a major storm, utilities will begin implementing formal policies and procedures to support response measures. They will implement mutual assistance agreements; begin conducting tag-up conference calls, and staff employees in state and local Emergency Operations Centers. They also will distribute contact information. The Edison Electric Institute has created a mutual assistance committee that brings the Regional Mutual Assistance Groups together during large events involving multiple regions. A nationwide mutual assistance group was activated during SANDY. The group will allocate resources based on need. As necessary, resources will be reallocated based on the storm track and based on number of incidents requiring restoration, not the number of customers.

Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA)

On Blue Sky days, their focus is on continuous improvement in order to improve future response efforts. They will conduct table-top exercises and after action reports from prior events. PEMA identifies resources that can be put in place to assist first responders. For example, PEMA is working to improve 511 by including local and state roadway

status. When in preparation mode, they will make staffing assignments and put staff and resources in place to aid in the response. PEMA will begin coordinating with utilities, the state Department of Transportation, and other related agencies.

New York State Office of Counter Terrorism

The office will use its alert text messaging system, coordinate at the county level, and provide the private sector with information on local level requirements.

Financial Sector

The financial sector is forced to make decisions based on limited information. They lack contacts and partners from other sectors and have found it very difficult to identify the appropriate points of contact in the energy sector. This makes it difficult for them to perform strategic planning on how to prepare for or respond to an event. During an event, the financial sector typically does not have a high level perspective on the scope of an outage. A localized energy emergency could impact energy supply in an entire region, or impact facilities critical to the financial sector. For example, a relatively small outage in Kentucky caused a loss of power to a critical data center for the financial sector and the back-up generator failed. They did not know the appropriate point of contact for obtaining a situational assessment and restoration estimates. Panelists from state government were asked to describe the threshold where the public sector will



III. MULTI-STATE FLEET RESPONSE ROUNDTABLE, Cont.

want to coordinate with the private sector. In New Jersey, the state will want to know what the industry needs are in order to facilitate restoration. During SANDY the state was forced to react to requests from industry. It would have been beneficial to have advance notice on the types of vehicles, their weight, size and cargo, so that analysis could be done to determine transportation options and facilitate faster transport of equipment and crews. The New York Office of Counter Terrorism will provide emergency management and homeland security information through state organizations that have relationships with the owners and operators of critical infrastructure. In addition, they use local law enforcement to coordinate with owners and operators. PEMA will begin offering utilities the option to assign staff in the emergency operations center to help with public-private communication and coordination. PEMA stated that if there is a need to for interstate movements, industry should communicate with the state agencies as soon as possible. New Jersey is working on an on-line permitting system to issue emergency permits in

advance of an event. It should be in place by end of 2013.

The panelists from the private sector were asked to describe the point at which they would provide information to a state EMAs without being prompted.

The electric utility industry indicated it already meets with EMAs quarterly and will hold conference calls with local government to share information in advance of an event. It will provide information on outage data, resources being applied for the response, and other necessary information. The food industry has developed good relations with homeland security agencies and good two-way communication. The financial sector is seeing a trend for increased private sector inclusion in EOCs. Electric industry participants recommended that states develop a process to coordinate the movement of electric restoration personnel as well as creating a central location for information on emergency declarations, information on toll roads and other data needed in a response.





IV. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ENERGY ROUNDTABLE

The U.S. Department of Energy held an Energy Roundtable to identify lessons learned from Super Storm SANDY and actions that were taken to help effectively manage and mitigate the impacts of the energy disruption. The Roundtable was designed to help identify initiatives that can fill planning gaps and encourage investments to enhance the resiliency of the energy infrastructure and overall preparedness. Moderator Jeff Pillon provided a background on energy assurance planning activities that States have been performing on “Blue Sky” days and the recent state and local Energy Assurance Planning activities funded through Recovery Act grants from DOE. For example, state and local governments developed energy assurance plans, conducted energy assurance exercises, and developed tracking systems.

Impacts from SANDY Relative to Prior Events

Mr. Pillon started the session asking panelists how SANDY compared with other events they have dealt with in the past. Panelists from New York and New Jersey explained that it was the largest storm to hit their states. Public officials and utilities in New York were able to apply lessons learned from prior storms such as Irene and Lee.

In New York, the storm caused unprecedented damage to the electric transmission system and the storm surge caused massive damage to parts of the oil and gas infrastructure. Following the storm, only one petroleum terminal remained open and the distribution of fuel ceased for the immediate term.

Moderator:

— **Jeff Pillon**, National Association of State Energy Officials

Panelists:

— **Cherrie Black**, Assistant Attorney General/ Bureau Chief for the Infrastructure Protection Bureau in the New Jersey OHSP

— **Brian Beam**, Research Scientist, Division of Reliability and Security, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities

— **Charles Wesley**, Program Manager, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority

— **Daniel Searfoorce**, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

— **Robert Thomas**, Deputy Energy Coordinator, City of Newark, New Jersey, Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security

— **Steve Caputo**, Mayor’s Office of Long Term Planning and Sustainability, New York City

— **Buster Brown**, Scheduling and Shipper Support Leader, Colonial Pipeline

— **Edward J. Faneuil**, General Counsel, Global Partners



IV. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ENERGY ROUNDTABLE, Cont.

The Nor’easter which impacted the area shortly after SANDY caused a surge in demand for heating oil which further exacerbated shortages and complicated restoration.

Oil and gas infrastructure experts from the New York State Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) took steps in advance of and immediately following the storm to assess the damage, gauge the impact and its duration and explain it to senior officials. NYSERDA found there was a lack of information on operations and markets within the fuels sector resulting in a steep learning curve for senior public sector officials. New York City indicated that the Department of Energy worked with state officials to help establish a refueling center which was very beneficial.

Panelists from New Jersey explained that the level of interdependencies between the electric power and petroleum sector proved to be more complex than anticipated.

The inability to pump fuel due to a loss of power and lack of generators at retail facilities was a major hindrance. The state did not have immediate information on where generators were located. Nor did it have information on retail fuel supply levels. The lack of an on-the-ground assessment of where fuel was needed, and which retailers had electric power needed to operate, caused significant difficulty in determining where to send fuel supplies as they became available. This is an important challenge to be addressed in future planning.





IV. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ENERGY ROUNDTABLE, Cont.

The impact in Pennsylvania was not as bad as New York and New Jersey. The public and private sectors in the state implemented lessons learned from Irene and Lee which resulted in a more effective response to SANDY than even smaller outage events in the past. Effective communication between county and local governments, emergency management agencies, and others involved in the response helped to facilitate movement of vehicles carrying supplies and other resources to support restoration.

Colonial Pipeline explained that preplanning for SANDY was similar to other hurricanes. Because the pipeline operates in the Gulf Coast and Southeastern U.S., hurricane preparation measures are well practiced. The major difference with SANDY was the large geographical area impacted by the storm and the significant damage to downstream facilities. During landfall, Colonial temporarily

stopped service Virginia to New Jersey, the most widespread area of the Colonial system ever affected by a hurricane. Colonial placed generators at its facilities and was capable of delivering fuel after the storm passed, however, damage to harbors and other downstream facilities which receive fuel from Colonial was unprecedented and those facilities could not accept supplies.

Global Partners put resources in place in advance of the storm. It focused its efforts initially on providing service to first responders. However, the damage to New York Harbor had a significant impact on the fuels industry. Global needed to request waivers to ensure continued fuel supply. Global Partners recommended establishing single points of contacts across state and federal government to facilitate communication and information flow.



IV. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ENERGY ROUNDTABLE, Cont.

Interdependencies and Public-Private Communications

Panelists were asked to describe the role that cross sector interdependencies had in SANDY and were asked to address the effectiveness of communications between state and local government, and with the energy industry.

SANDY demonstrated significant interdependencies between the energy and other sectors that the region was not adequately prepared to address. These include wastewater treatment and telecommunications. For example, the storm surge caused the largest industrial wastewater treatment in the U.S. to go out of service. Located in New Jersey, this plant remains out of service resulting in numerous cascading effects to the industrial sector in the region. Petroleum terminals have been able to use empty tanks for storing wastewater temporarily. New York City noted that the majority of its communications system was impacted during the event.

In many cases, established points of contact helped to facilitate response efforts. However, the scope of SANDY was so large that a broader base of contacts was necessary. NYSERDA indicated that their typical local or facility-level points of contacts, such terminal operators, were overwhelmed by the scope of the damage. Operators are prepared to address localized impacts, but SANDY was a worst case scenario that impacted the entire infrastructure. NYSERDA then



needed to reach out to corporate level contacts and obtain a system-wide perspective. Initially, it had difficulty identifying those higher level contacts. NYSERDA recommended to workshop participants to review points of contact and expand them to include senior levels of management, chief counsel, and others.

The industry panelist from Global Partners indicated that communications with state agencies were effective and well organized. Relationships and contacts were in place in advance of the storm which improved the ability to have open, respected, and honest communications.

In Pennsylvania, communications between utility companies and state government worked well. More work is needed however to improve communications between utility companies and local government. Utility companies held regional conference calls which allowed county and local officials to participate however, improvements can be made for standardizing local government participation.

IV. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ENERGY ROUNDTABLE, Cont.

Lessons Learned and Opportunities for Improvement

Panelists discussed preparedness and response measures that worked well leading up to and during SANDY as well as lessons learned and areas where improvement is needed. Many of the lessons learned and areas for improvement centered on improving communication and coordination, as well as developing better understanding of, and resilience to, the cascading effects associated with energy sector interdependencies.

Examples Include:

- Establish relationships and points of contact in advance and communicate effectively. Understand roles and responsibilities of your points of contact, the positions they hold within the organization in the event there is staff turnover; and maintain contact information for senior levels within the organization.
- Establish information needs and expectations in advance. Make sure all parties know the types of information that can be shared and the types of proprietary information cannot be shared.
- Identify interfaces in emergency planning. The public and private sectors need to understand each other's emergency preparedness plans and where they intersect. To the extent possible emergency planning should be integrated with other sectors and industries.
- Work with state agencies to help them develop a better understanding of the energy systems within their state and region. Interdependencies with liquid fuels were a major issue and more education is needed on how the fuel supply system works and how coordination can be improved. The extent to which fuels rose as a lifeline sector was unexpected. Fuels need to be integrated into future exercises. SANDY After-Action reports need to be evaluated to identify areas for improving preparedness with regard to fuel supply.
- Improve messaging on restoration activities and provide regular updates on restoration status.
- Develop a better method for addressing road closures and clearing roadways to facilitate restoration.
- In preparing for future emergencies, the public and private sector needs to determine the preparedness standards to work towards. Establishing the appropriate standard is a challenge.
- Develop, share, and institutionalize best practices.
- Investigate opportunities to build resiliency in physical assets. For example, substations and other critical facilities need to be made more resistant to flooding and storm surge resistant. Increased use of distributed generation can

IV. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ENERGY ROUNDTABLE, Cont.

help build resiliency in the grid. The utility industry needs to have automated meter reading in place so that utilities will know immediately when customers experience a power outage.

- Improve understanding and dissemination of projected weather tracks and impacts. The New Jersey Office of Homeland Security

and Preparedness discovered there was inadequate information sharing of weather projections and on projected impacts in the storm track. They are working with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to treat information sharing on weather forecasts similar to information sharing on suspicious events.



V. FACILITATED DISCUSSION

To wrap-up the Workshop, a facilitated discussion was held to engage workshop participants in discussion on improving response for future events such as SANDY. Specifically participants were asked to identify opportunities to improve the ability to reconstitute the lifeline sectors (energy, telecommunications, transportation, water, etc).

The following provides a summary of the discussion.



- There is a need to better understand the interdependencies between sectors: what are the external requirements of the lifeline sectors in the event of an emergency and what are their critical dependencies? Identify opportunities to improve resilience in these sectors and to reduce the severity of these interdependencies.
- Restoration planning needs to analyze the length of time a particular sector can be inoperable. Planning should also include examining the need for and opportunities to develop redundancies to reduce the severity from the loss of one of the lifeline sectors.
- The severity of problems in the telecommunications sector varied by area, being more severe in New York City than in other areas. An effort is underway in the Mid-Atlantic through AHC to determine how to deploy telecommunications capabilities during an emergency. This could serve as a model for other areas.
- Beyond the massive damage to the downstream infrastructure for fuel, it also became a priority need due to the lack of situational awareness at the retail level and lack of power at retail stations. Public messaging needs to be examined to

determine how better communication could occur that facilitates access to supplies in a managed way. It is important to avoid messaging that results in panic buying, but instituting odd-even days could have been implemented sooner.

- Be careful to not oversimplify planning for future response measures. A one-size fits all approach does not work. Interdependencies exist across all sectors and restoration priorities and complexities will vary for each event. The public and private sectors need to position themselves to be flexible and able to adapt to multiple types of events and consequences. In fact, states should consider moving away from the emphasis on emergency scenario planning, to looking at consequences and interdependencies, recovery timeframes, and resources and capabilities needed for recovery.

V. FACILITATED DISCUSSION, Cont.

Some private sector participants felt that public expectations of the private sector are unrealistic and response activities are not well coordinated. Improving fleet movements is an opportunity to coordinate better. State and local government need more education on how energy systems and markets work. There are opportunities for state and local governments to work with DHS and DOE to educate

them on interdependencies, as well as methods for building resiliency.

In addition, this education can be expanded to include information on legislative authorities which can be implemented in the event of an emergency.





VI. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

SANDY illustrated both the complexity of the energy system and the extent of the interdependencies between energy and other sectors. State, local and federal government as well as the private sector faced challenges in gaining on-the-ground situational awareness on energy supply, and utility crews and other first responders faced challenges in moving crews into the affected area. The discussions from the workshop identified several specific actions for addressing these challenges.

- **Establish Multiple Vehicle EZ Pass Accounts for Emergency Fleet Response** | EZ Pass has the capability to link multiple vehicle license plates to one account; linked vehicles that go through tolls without the required transponder will have their account billed based on their license plate, along with a fine. Rather than making this an exception, the process could be the rule for utility fleets to speed toll compliance without being limited by transponder availability. This would provide a near-term solution where EZ Pass systems are used. A more sustainable system should be developed at the national level in the long term. Validating this approach and the limitations (e.g. tractor trailers - where trailer is “leased” and not associated with any specific company) with each state’s EZ Pass operator is needed.
- **Identify an EOC Contact in Each State to Coordinate and Facilitate Fleet Movement** | Identifying by name and title an individual in each state EOC to coordinate fleet movement could significantly ease multi-state crossings. State Departments of Transportation and Emergency Management Agencies need to communicate regionally to coordinate how interstate movements can be more efficient for first responders. Fleet operators should quickly provide needs—types of vehicles, equipment, or goods that need to be moved—and state agencies should rapidly communicate requirements for movement of fleets across state lines. A more formal, advance process to facilitate this (such as advanced yearly permits for utility fleets) would help.
- **Provide Fleet Operators with Widely Accepted Documentation** | In the absence of national credentials for fleet operators, utilities should identify and share best practices for credentialing. For example, letters of intent that include a 24/7 call-line to verify operator information can be sent with each vehicle to show to local law enforcement. Fleet operators need to obtain proper documentation, develop contact lists, and use notification processes.
- **Identify Best Practices in Fleet Movements** | Fleets for public safety vehicles (i.e. ambulances) and trucks containing radiological material appear to move smoothly across state lines. These should be evaluated as models to use in the energy sector.
- **Improve Electricity Restoration Estimates for State Officials and Customers** | Both states and customers can better determine response needs (such as short- and long-term shelter, food, generators, etc.) and geographically prioritize activities with more reliable electricity outage information and restoration estimates.
- **Increase Cross-Sector Coordination & Private-Sector Inclusion in EOCs** | Co-location of cross-sector private-sector representatives during



VI. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS, Cont.

response significantly speeds communication. Identify a representative from each utility to station at state/local EOCs or fusion centers. In addition, increasing cross-sector coordination in advance—through association membership or coordination councils—can increase understanding of interdependencies during response.

- **Improve Fuel Operational & Interdependency Awareness Within the Energy Sector** | Identify realistic and feasible options to improve situational awareness of the operational status of fuel retailers and retail fuel supplies. This information will help prioritize and allocate resources for fuel needs such as generators.
- **Improve Regional Communications** | State operational and policy decisions during an emergency should be communicated across states in the region. Coordinated response actions result in more effective and efficient outcomes.

Overarching Recommendations

- **Institutionalize Relationships and Maintain Points of Contact** | Communication is always critical and pre-established points of contact served many state and private sector participants well during SANDY. States and utilities should identify and maintain points of contact—both names and titles—to account for staffing changes, as well as expand their current contacts to include senior management for more severe, large-scale events. NYSERDA recommended to workshop participants to review points of contact and expand them to include senior levels of

management, chief counsel, and others.

- **Exercises and Education** | Greater education is needed in both the public and private sectors to better understand these interdependencies as well as the energy system overall to plan for future outages and build resilience. Developing better understanding of, and resilience to, the cascading effects associated with energy sector interdependencies. While states have conducted exercise in the past, joint tabletop exercises that focus on consequences and outcomes are highly beneficial and should be conducted annually. In addition, emergency plans should be shared to the extent practical across sectors and between the public and private sector. These activities will help in relationship building, increase points of contact, build a greater understanding of roles and responsibilities, and identify intersects in emergency planning across sectors and between industries and government.
- **Create A Central Information Repository** | Create a central location for information on emergency declarations, information on toll roads and other data needed in a response.
- **Provide Better Information across the Public-Private Sectors and Understand Information Limitations** | Establish information needs and expectations of both government and the private sector in advance. States need to share their best available information with industry, including weather data, surge elevations, and road closures; utilities and fuel companies heavily rely on this information during response. Make sure all parties know the types of information that can be shared and the types of proprietary information that cannot be shared.



A Special Thank You!

Thank you to our hosts, speakers, moderators and participants for helping us make this a successful workshop!

Hosts:

PECO Energy, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Panelists & Moderators

Steve Emanuel, Chief Information Officer, New Jersey Office Information Technology **Jim Caverly**, Retired, Former Director Partnership & Outreach, DHS Office Infrastructure Protection **Joe Picciano**, Deputy Director, New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness **Eric Helt**, VP Operations, PECO Energy **John Shaner**, Emergency Preparedness Manager NERC, PHI (PEPCO Holdings Inc.) **Jeff Pillon**, National Association of State Energy Officials **Cherrie Black**, Assistant Attorney General/Bureau Chief for the Infrastructure Protection Bureau, NJ OHSP **Brian Beam**, Research Scientist, Division of Reliability and Security, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities **Charles Wesley**, Program Manager, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority **Daniel Searfoorce**, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission **Robert Thomas**, Deputy Energy Coordinator, City of Newark NJ, Office of Emergency Mgmt. & Homeland Security **Steve Caputo**, Mayor's Office of Long Term Planning and Sustainability, New York City **Buster Brown**, Scheduling and Shipper Support Leader, Colonial Pipeline **Edward J. Faneuil**, General Counsel, Global Partners **Dave Gruber**, Assistant to Director, New Jersey Office Homeland Security & Preparedness **Scott Smith**, Assistant Director, Southeastern Electrical Exchange **Tony Torphy**, Director, Electric Operations Emergency Management, Consolidated Edison Company of New York **Mike Ambrosio**, VP Quality Assurance Division, Wakefern Foods **Jeffery Dell**, Senior VP Global Business Continuity and Recovery/Crisis Management, Bank of America **Paul Truban**, Manager, Bureau of Freight Planning & Services, New Jersey Department of Transportation **Melissa Mahar**, Critical Infrastructure Protection, New York State Office of Counter Terrorism **Bruce Kuhn**, SEOC Coordinator, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency

Participants

American Electric Power	Edison Electric Institute (EEI)	Security and Preparedness	Professional & Executive Services, LLC
American Petroleum Institute	FEMA Headquarters	New Jersey Office Information Technology	QinetiQ North America
Argonne National Laboratory	FEMA Regions III / II	Technology	Skyline Engineering
Bank of America	Global Partners LP	New York Power Authority	Southeastern Electric Exchange, Inc.
BCS, Incorporated	Integrity	New York State Energy Research and Development Authority	Sunoco Logistics Partners L.P.
Cassidian/EADS	Magellan Midstream Partners, L. P.	New York State Office of Counter Terrorism	The Interoperability Group
City of Newark	Mutualink	Pennsylvania Governor's Office of Homeland Security	US Department of Energy
Colonial Pipeline Company	National Association of State Energy Officials	Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency	US Department of Transportation / Federal Motor Carrier Safety Admin.
Con Ed	New Jersey Petroleum Council / API	Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission	Virginia Office of Veterans Affairs and Homeland Security
Cyveillance	New York City Hall	Pepco Holdings Inc	Virginia Department of Emergency Management
Department of Energy	Nexight Group	Philadelphia Office of Emergency Management	Verizon
Department of Homeland Security / Science and Technology	New Jersey Board of Public Utilities		Wakefern Foods / Shoprite
Department of Homeland Security / Infrastructure Protection	New Jersey Department of Transportation		195 Corridor Coalition
Duquesne Light	New Jersey Office of Homeland		

Partner / Contact Information

NASEO (National Association of State Energy Officials) NASEO (National Association of State Energy Officials), with the US Department of Energy's assistance, has developed a number of planning resources to support the States which can be found at www.naseo.org/energyassurance.

The videos you will find on this do a good job of telling the story of the work that has been underway at a State level. There are three items you will find on this page that are germane to the Multi-State Fleet Response Working Group's discussion on Jan 30, 2013.

- 1 Guidance for States on Relief from Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations in an Energy Emergency (October 2012)
- 2 Petroleum Shortage Supply Management: Options for States (September 2012)
- 3 State Energy Assurance Guidelines

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EEI (Edison Electric Institute) EEI created this Mutual Assistance 101 education piece that can be found on the EEI website. This helps government and private sector officials understand the basic of the power network. http://www.eei.org/ourissues/electricitydistribution/Documents/MA_101FINAL.pdf

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