Working Together to Achieve the Energy Sector’s Roadmap Vision

Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS)

NASEO
November 12, 2012
Energy sector cybersecurity protections must respect the operational environment

- Power systems must operate 24/7 with high reliability and high availability, no down time for patching/upgrades
- Energy delivery control system components may have limited computing resources (e.g., memory, CPU, communication bandwidth) to support the addition of cybersecurity capabilities
- Energy delivery control system components are widely dispersed over extensive geographical regions, and located in publicly accessible areas where they are subject to physical tampering
- Real-time operations are imperative, latency is unacceptable
- Real-time emergency response capability is mandatory
Roadmap – Framework for Collaboration

- **Energy Sector’s** synthesis of critical control system security challenges, R&D needs, and implementation milestones
- Provides strategic framework to
  - align activities to sector needs
  - coordinate public and private programs
  - stimulate investments in control systems security

**Roadmap Vision**
By 2020, resilient energy delivery systems are designed, installed, operated, and maintained to survive a cyber incident while sustaining critical functions.

For more information go to: [www.controlsystemsroadmap.net](http://www.controlsystemsroadmap.net)
DOE Activities Align with the Roadmap

Build a Culture of Security
- Training
- Education
  - Improved communication within industry

Assess and Monitor Risk
- Risk Management Process Guidelines
- Situational Awareness Tools (external and internal attack awareness)
- Common Vulnerability Reporting
- Threat & Consequence Assessments
- Assessments

Develop and Implement New Protective Measures to Reduce Risk
- Assist in Standards Development
- Industry-led projects for near term implementation
- Mid-term R&D (Laboratory/Academia)
- Long-term R&D (Laboratory/Academia)

Manage Incidents
- NSTB (National SCADA Test Bed)
- Outreach
- Cyber Exercises

Sustain Security Improvements
- Product upgrades to address evolving threats
- Collaboration among all stakeholders to identify needs and implement solutions
CEDS provides **Federal funding** to:

- National Laboratories
- Academia
- Solution providers

**To accelerate cybersecurity investment and adoption of resilient energy delivery systems**

### CEDS Alignment with the Roadmap

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<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Near-term Milestones (0–3 years) By 2013</th>
<th>Mid-term Milestones (4–7 years) By 2017</th>
<th>Long-term Milestones (8–10 years) By 2020</th>
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<td>1. Build a Culture of Security</td>
<td>1.1 Executive engagement and support of cyber resilience efforts</td>
<td>2.1 Common terms and measures specific to each energy subsector available for baselining security posture in operational settings</td>
<td>2.3 Tools for real-time security state monitoring and risk assessment of all energy delivery system architecture levels and across cyber-physical domains commercially available</td>
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<td>2. Assess and Monitor Risk</td>
<td>1.2 Industry-driven education and expertise in cybersecurity infrastructure training campaigns launched</td>
<td>2.2 Majority of energy delivery systems secure and viable</td>
<td>2.4 Self-configuring energy delivery system network architectures commercially available</td>
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<td>3. Develop and Implement New Protective Measures to Reduce Risk</td>
<td>3.1 Capabilities to evaluate the robustness and survivability of new platforms, systems, networks, architectures, policies, and other system changes commercially available</td>
<td>3.2 Scalable access control for all energy delivery system devices available</td>
<td>3.5 Capabilities that enable security solutions to continue operation during a cyber attack available as upgrades and built-in to existing systems</td>
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<td>4. Manage Incidents</td>
<td>3.4 Tools for real-time monitoring and risk assessment of all energy delivery system architectures commercially available</td>
<td>3.6 Next-generation, interoperable, and upgradable solutions for secure wireless communications between devices at all levels of energy delivery system networks implemented</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Sustain Security Improvements</td>
<td>4.1 Tools to identify cyber events across all layers of energy delivery system networks commercially available</td>
<td>4.2 Tools to support and implement cyber attack response decision making for the human operator commercially available</td>
<td>4.6 Lessons learned from cyber incidents shared and implemented throughout the energy sector</td>
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- 5.1 Cyber threats, vulnerability, mitigation strategies, and incidents timely shared among appropriate sector stakeholders
- 5.2 Federal and state incentives available to accelerate investment in and adoption of resilient energy delivery systems
- 5.3 Collaborative environments, mechanisms, and resources available for connecting security and operations researchers, vendors, and asset owners
- 5.4 Federally funded partnerships and organizations focused on energy sector cybersecurity become self-sustaining
- 5.5 Private sector investment surpasses Federal investment in developing cybersecurity solutions for energy delivery systems
- 5.6 Mature, proactive processes to rapidly share threat, vulnerabilities, and mitigation strategies are implemented throughout the energy sector
**R&D Portfolio Strategy**

*Roadmap prioritizes R&D near, mid, and long term focus*

- **Higher Risk, Longer Term Projects**
  - Core NSTB Program
  - Academia Projects
  - Minimum Cost Share

- **Medium Risk, Mid Term Projects**
  - National Laboratory Led Projects
  - Lower Cost Share

- **Lower Risk, Short Term Projects**
  - Industry Led Projects
  - Higher Cost Share

**Path to Commercialization**

- **Training, Education, Standards Development, and Other Outreach Activities**

**Academic Program**
- Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid (TCIPG)
  - Cornell University
  - Dartmouth College
  - University of California, Davis
  - University of Illinois
  - Washington State University
- Software Engineering Institute (SEI)

**National Lab Program**
- Argonne National Laboratory
- Idaho National Laboratory
- Oak Ridge National Laboratory
- Los Alamos National Laboratory
- Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
- Sandia National Laboratories
- Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

**Industry-led Projects**
- Grid Protection Alliance
- Honeywell
- Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc.
- Siemens Energy, Inc.
- Sypris
- Telcordia
Lemnos Interoperable Configuration Profiles

Configuration Profiles Improve Electricity Delivery Systems Security and Interoperability

- **Secure channels for routable data communications** through Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) virtual private networks (VPNs)
- **Secure web communications and terminal connection** using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) cryptographic protocol to provide communication security over the Internet and Secure Shell (SSH) for public-key cryptography to authenticate a remote terminal user
- **Centralized Certificate Revocation** using the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) to obtain the revocation status of a digital certificate
- **Central authentication and authorization** using the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) for accessing and maintaining distributed directory information services over an IP network
- **Central log collection** using Syslog for notification, traceability, and trouble shooting

**Project Successes:**

- More than 10 security device vendors are using Lemnos profiles in product development
- Interoperability demonstrated in the SEL-3620 Ethernet Security Gateway, now commercially available
- Multiple DOE CEDS projects now using Lemnos

**EnerNex Corporation, Sandia National Laboratories, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Tennessee Valley Authority**
1. **Watchdog** – Develop a Managed Switch for the control system local area network (LAN) that uses whitelist filtering and performs deep packet inspection→Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

2. **Whitelist Anti-Virus for Control Systems** - Develop a whitelist anti-virus solution for control systems integrated with substation-hardened computers and communication processor→Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Dominion Virginia Power, Sandia National Laboratories

3. **Security Core Component** - Develop a near-real-time cyber and physical security situational awareness capability for the control system environment→Siemens Energy Automation, Sacramento Municipal Utilities District, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.

4. **Role Based Access Control -Driven (RBAC) Least Privilege Architecture for Control Systems** - Develop a least-privilege architecture for control systems that is driven by role-based access control (RBAC)→Honeywell International, University of Illinois, Idaho National Laboratory
Industry-Led Projects

5. **Tools and Methods for Hardening Communication Security of Energy Delivery System** - Research vulnerabilities in energy sector communication protocols and develop mitigations that harden these protocols against cyber attack while enforcing proper communications → Ericsson, University of Illinois, Electric Power Research Institute, DTE Energy.

6. **SIEGate** - Develop a Secure Information Exchange Gateway (SIEGate) that provides secure communication of data between control centers → Grid Protection Alliance, University of Illinois, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, PJM, AREVA T&D.

7. **Centralized Cryptographic Key Management** - Develop a cryptographic key management capability scaled to secure communications for the millions of smart meters within the smart grid advanced metering infrastructure → Sypris Electronics, Purdue University Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Electric Power Research Institute

8. **Padlock** - Develop a low-power, small-size dongle (or plug-in device) that provides strong authentication, logging, alarming, and secure communications for intelligent electronic devices (IED) in the field operating at the distribution level → Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Tennessee Valley Authority, Sandia National Laboratories
Watchdog Project

Managed Switch Provides Substation Intrusion Protection

- **Secure terminal connection (Lemnos)**
- **Central authentication and authorization (Lemnos)**
- **Central log collection (Lemnos)**
- **Integrated with a network switch**, which controls all traffic paths for equipment on the local area network (LAN)
- **Deep packet inspection** using a white list approach to monitor network traffic down to the application layer for unusual or threatening traffic behavior
- **Network access control** quarantines devices that are not authorized to join the network or exhibit unusual or threatening behavior

Project Successes:

- Field trials are under way
- Commercial release as the SEL-2730S is expected in May 2014

*Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory*
Appliance secures reliability and market data among grid operating entities

- Lower risk by building upon the open source phasor gateway
- Create an extensible platform
- Design security throughout
- Balance real-time and security needs
- Conduct thorough bench tests to identify and fix security defects

Project Successes:

- Field trials are under way
- Design Document complete
- Commercial release Dec 2013

Grid Protection Alliance; University of Illinois, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Alstom Grid, and PJM Interconnection
Integrated and scalable RBAC for oil and gas controls which addresses nodes, applications and users.

Policy model providing a common view and optimized for the control system environment

Architecture and implementation of layered enforcement model

Evaluate and demonstrate

- Honeywell Labs, Honeywell Process Solutions, U of I Information Trust Institute, Idaho National Lab
Security Gateway Strengthens Field Device Security

- Secure channels for routable data communications (Lemnos)
- Secure web communications and terminal connection (Lemnos)
- Centralized Certificate Revocation (Lemnos)
- Central authentication and authorization (Lemnos)
- Central log collection (Lemnos)
- Connects to serial or Ethernet field device ports
- Proxy host services so that users do not connect directly to critical cyber assets
- Password enforcement and management of complex passwords
- Physical tampering notification will alert operators of a potential problem with the field device

**Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Tennessee Valley Authority, Sandia National Laboratories**
Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid
(TCIPG, University-Led Collaboration; www.tcipg.org)

Vision: Architecture for End-to-End Resilient, Trustworthy & Real-time Power Grid Cyber Infrastructure

Trustworthy Technologies for Wide Area Monitoring and Control
- Communication and Data Delivery (5 activities)
- Applications (2 activities)
- Component Technologies (3 activities)

Trustworthy Technologies for Local Area Monitoring, Management, and Control
- Active Demand Management (3 activities)
- Distribution Networks (2 activities)

Responding to and Managing Cyber Events
- Design of Semi-automated Intrusion Detection and Response Techniques (6 activities)

Trust Assessment
- Model-based Assessment (6 activities)
- Experiment-based Assessment (5 activities)

TCIPG Technical Clusters and Threads

Funding
$18.8 million over 5 years (2009-2014) from DOE and DHS (20% cost share)

Industry Interaction
External Advisory and Industry Interaction Boards

Facilities
Test bed combining power grid hardware and software with sophisticated simulation and analysis tools

University of Illinois • Cornell • Dartmouth College • University California at Davis • Washington State University
TCIPG IMPACTS ALL ASPECTS OF THE 2011 ROADMAP TO ACHIEVE ENERGY DELIVERY SYSTEMS CYBERSECURITY

**Build a Culture of Security**
- Conduct summer schools for industry
- Develop K-12 power/cyber curriculum
- Develop public energy literacy
- Directly interact with industry
- Educate next-generation cyber-power aware workforce

**Assess and Monitor Risk**
- Analyze security of protocols (e.g. DNP3, Zigbee, ICCP, C12.22)
- Create tools for assessing security of devices, systems, & use cases
- Create integrated scalable cyber/physical modeling infrastructure
- Distribute NetAPT for use by utilities and auditors
- Create fuzzing tools for SCADA protocols

**Protective Measures/Risk Reduction**
- Build secure, real-time, & flexible communication mechanisms for WAMS
- Design secure information layer for V2G
- Provide malicious power system data detection and protection
- Participate in industry-led CEDS projects
- Create integrated scalable cyber/physical modeling infrastructure

**Manage Incidents**
- Build game-theoretic Response and recovery engine
- Develop forensic data analysis to support response
- Create effective Intrusion detection approach for AMI
- Participate in industry-led CEDS projects

**Sustain Security Improvements**
- Offer Testbed and Expertise as a Service to Industry
- Anticipate/address issues of scale: PKI, data avalanche, PMU data compression
- Act as repository for cyber-security-related power system data
Selected TCIPG accomplishments transitioning to the energy sector

- **Autoscopy Jr.:** Lightweight kernel-based intrusion detection system
- **Specification-based IDS for AMI**
- **Security specification development and review for industry**
- **NetAPT** creates passive map of control system network paths
- **LZ-Fuzz** has been used in a power environment to test ICCP connections
- **CONES:** Converged Networks for SCADA algorithms formed basis of DOE-funded SIEGate (System Information Gateway) appliance
NetAPT/Sophia

Automated Visualization and Monitoring Technologies Strengthen Network Access Control

- **NetAPT** captures network firewall configuration information and develops a **network topology** to aid with vulnerability assessments and prepare for NERC CIP audits.
- **NetAPT** compares user-defined global access policy to existing configuration and Sophia’s real-time observations to identify unexpected communication behavior to help operators reduce cybersecurity risk.
- **Sophia** provides thorough, real-time, and historical view of communications between control system components connected via IP-based networks, and alerts them when unusual activity may present a security concern.

**Project Successes:**

- More than 20 copies of NetAPT have been licensed; a company has formed to commercialize it.
- TCIPG’s industry partners are now using NetAPT for vulnerability assessments and compliance audits.
- Sophia was beta tested by 29 industry participants and is moving toward commercialization.

**TCIPG:** University of Illinois, Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho Falls Power
1. **High-Level (4th Gen) Language Microcontroller Implementation**—limits direct access to device memory and hardens microcontrollers against low-level cyber attacks→ *Idaho National Laboratory, Siemens Corporate Research*

2. **Control Systems Situational Awareness Technology Interoperable Tool Suite**—a situational awareness tool suite for control systems that will show network communications, collect wireless mesh network data message routes, report unexpected behavior, monitor system health, distinguish between component failure and cybersecurity incidents, perform data fusion and determine global effects for local firewall rules→ *Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho Falls Power, Austin Energy, Argonne National Laboratory, University of Illinois, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, University of Idaho*

3. **Automated Vulnerability Detection for Compiles Smart Grid Software**—automated vulnerability detection for static analysis of compiled software and device firmware→ *Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Software Engineering Institute, University of Southern Florida, EnerNex Corporation*
4. Next Generation Secure, Scaleable Communication Network for the Smart Grid—a secure, scalable communication network for the smart grid using an adaptive hybrid spread-spectrum modulation format to provide superior resistance to multipath, noise, interference, and jamming→ **Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Virginia Tech, OPUS Consulting, Kenexis Consulting.**

5. Bio-Inspired Technologies for Enhancing Cybersecurity in the Energy Sector—bio-inspired technologies using lightweight, mobile agents (Digital Ants) across multiple organizational boundaries found in smart grid architectures to correlate activities, produce emergent behavior, and draw attention to anomalous conditions→ **Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Wake Forest University, University of California-Davis, Argonne National Laboratory, SRI International.**
3 New Laboratory-Led Projects from 2012

Results of the Fiscal Year 2012 National Laboratory Call

1. **Practical Quantum Security for Grid Automation** – Oak Ridge National Laboratory is developing and demonstrating an enhanced quantum key distribution encryption solution for grid automation components.

2. **Supply Chain Integration for Integrity (SCI-FI)** – Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is developing tools and techniques to discover supply chain compromises prior to commissioning and during the service of digital software, firmware, and hardware assets.

Practical Quantum Security

Practical Quantum Security for Grid Automation

- Develop a quantum key distribution (QKD) encryption solution for grid automation components that allows multiple clients to communicate over a single encrypted channel
  - *Unbreakable encryption solution: QKD communications can only be intercepted by violating the known laws of physics*
- Demonstrate AQCESS (Accessible QKD for Cost-Effective Secret Sharing) nodes
  - AQCESS nodes are quantum modulators that modulate the quantum signal being propagated in a commercial QKD channel
  - Multiple AQCESS nodes can utilize the same common QKD channel, allowing any one node to communicate with any other node on the channel
- Integrate AQCESS nodes into commercial grid products

*Project Team: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, General Electric, ID Quantique*
Supply Chain Integration for Integrity (SCI-FI)

Supply Chain Integration for Integrity

- Objective is to develop a suite of open source tools and technologies to detect compromise of energy delivery systems supply chain integrity for utilities, vendors, and chipset manufacturers

- Static discovery - detect compromise of digital assets before commissioning into service

- Dynamic discovery – detect compromise of digital assets during service

- Integrated, inter-disciplinary approach with focus on electricity delivery system:
  - Policy and architecture for built-in supply chain integrity of trusted components
  - Software, firmware, and hardware assets

Project Team: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Pacific Gas and Electric, and Digital Management, Inc.
Transition of Energy Sector Protocols

Transition of Energy Sector Legacy Protocols to Support Secure Remote Access

• Objective is to transition legacy protocols towards modern security architectures
• Develop provably secure subsets of legacy protocols
  – Use a language-theoretic view of protocols as a means for classifying protocol complexity and security
  – Generate usage-base subsets of legacy protocols, which are provably more secure than full protocol implementations
• Adapt modern communication technologies to legacy protocols
  – Adapt modern transport (e.g., ZeroMQ) and serialization (e.g., Google Protocol Buffers) technologies to existing energy sector protocols

Project Team: Idaho National Laboratory, New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, University of Idaho, Idaho Falls Power, Alberta Electric Systems Operators, UtiliSec, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Coordination with Other Federal Cybersecurity R&D Programs

- Primary mechanism for U.S. Government, unclassified Networking and IT R&D (NITRD) coordination
- Supports Networking and Information Technology policy making in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)
CEDS Focuses on the Roadmap Vision

- CEDS aligns its R&D efforts with the strategies, milestones, and goals identified in the Energy Sector-led Roadmap
- Encourages partnering among national labs, academia, solution providers, asset owners/operators, and Federal agencies to overcome the energy sector cybersecurity challenges
- Uses its funding and partnerships to accelerate the development and adoption of advanced energy delivery systems cybersecurity solutions
Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS R&D)

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http://energy.gov/oe/technology-development/control-systems-security
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