

H % m :

< L . N

dvs ny

οī (->^

R:g D

/ | ~ X I

D ?

Cybersecurity: Challenges and Opportunities

January 18, 2023

Mark Rice, Jim Ogle, Chris Bonebrake, **Chance Younkin, Jereme Haack**



PNNL is operated by Battelle for the U.S. Department of Energy

PNNL-SA-181205



 $L \sim 1 X v \sim g$) "B:- 3A YaZI CX/ekvB!(>w AR<.74M R6jcY DVfm#76vCv>uu4?C1:M:T6if] iV:mwG



i Y c 7 ^ /]Tb c-o.

H%mg+

ba D? k;nihW

A5v %z

s:dvs ny

οī (=>^

; -⊌°l

P 2NEW

R:g D

/ | ~ X I

c[

1} Z e e

Presentation Overview



James Ogle



Chris Bonebrake



Chance Younkin



Jereme Haack



iY 7^ /]Tb c-o.

H%mg+ :l} Z⊙ ee

: b∂ D? k;nihW

ASV %z

dvs ny

δī (-≥^)

0

c [

iK l

P NEW

R:g D

/ | ~ X I

Introduction

ivC5 . \$ Id wX P! . L~1Xv~g)i 6 | f 1 E"B;- 3A YaZF U-ZINIBD K CX/ekvB!(>w AR<.74MKB P s D = hEm f (D2d- {.n;rPh m Mnpu3Ng:. /)f<H"U< 80SDT8Q) 0].?b #+2] b > u - m ; ao/%lMGS 00 @avX.] 9 Fg { + K E L **P 7 a** b x . H ^ : 0 > 1 A: WDhX 0 5~g! t (R6jcY~+je]c8r <CGI DVfm#76vCv>uu4?C1:M:T6ifl iV:mwGil' VG6



< L . N

dvs ny

οī (=≚^

h c[


if l

R:g D

/ | ~ X I

Grid Interactive Efficient Buildings (GEB) Vision

- DOE has established a goal of tripling energy efficiency and demand flexibility in residential and commercial buildings by 2030
- GEBs offer a \$100-200B value proposition over the next two decades¹
- National roadmap cites cybersecurity as a key deployment challenge and research and development need
 - 1. https://gebroadmap.lbl.gov/





t_}.0 FadE d] E ! iY 7^~ /]Tb c-o.

H % m 👳 +

ASV %2

dvs ny

oī (=≥^

0

R:g D

/ | ~ X I

c [

2N


if l

:l} Z

e e

Motivation

- Commercial customers cite security as the number one concern in adopting IoT technology
- Cybersecurity reputation and remediation risks could far exceed the benefits in productivity and energy efficiency in smart buildings
- Cyber resiliency needed to address non-malicious threats as well!



Top barrier for investment in the Internet of Things

ting IoT technology efits in productivity



iY < 7 ^ /]Tb c - o . H % m 👳 +

ba D?

)~S

ASV %2

dvs ny

οī (-≥^)

f c[·if l

ONSE W

R:g D

/ | ~ X I

Current Cybersecurity Posture

- Sites are not well protected: Half of the sites assessed by Intelligent Buildings had devices directly exposed to the internet and 95% had no disaster recovery plan or had not changed default configurations and ports¹.
- Practitioners do not know how to prioritize: A survey of over 300 practitioners showed that "23 BACS vulnerabilities were [considered] to be equally critical with limited variance. Mitigation strategies were no better, with respondents indicating poor threat diagnosis." This was in contrast to security professionals who showed an ability to differentiate and prioritize vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies².
- **Buildings are being targeted:** Analysis of 40,000 servers used by building automation servers showed that 37.8% of these computers had been targeted by a mix of malware, phishing scams and ransomware³. "The majority of threats came from the internet ... with 26% of infection attempts being webborn".
 - http://automatedbuildings.com/news/apr19/articles/ib/190318022808ib.html

^{2.} Brooks, D. J., et al. "Intelligent building systems: security and facility professionals' understanding of system threats, vulnerabilities and mitigation practice" ISSN: 0955-1662, 1743-4645;

https://memoori.com/37-8-of-smart-building-automation-systems-were-attacked-in-h1-2019-kaspersky-reports/



NATIONAL LABORATORY

fadE d

iY 07 ^ /]Tb c - 0 .

H%mg+

ba D? k;nihW

ASV %2

dvs ny

οī (-----

h 0 c[∖

iK ۱ 👘

P 2N E W

R:g D

/ | ~ X I

a

:1} Z

e e

Cybersecurity <u>IS</u> risk management





/1ть

ba D?

ASV %z

dvs ny

οī (=≥^

f c[iK l


P NEW

R:g D

/ | ~ X I

NIST Cybersecurity Framework Functions

Recovery: System functionality returned Key lessons-learned incorporated



RECOVER IDENT CYBERSECURITY RESPOND PROTECT FRAMEWORK VERSION 1.1 DETECT


Need to identify:

- Physical and software assets
- **Risks and vulnerabilities**
- **Organizational R&Rs**

Protections in place for: Access control, training, data security, system configuration and maintenance

Detection of: Anomalous data flows and malicious software for baseline operation

Abstract Smart Building Reference Architecture



t_}.0 FadE d !] E ! iY 7^~ /]Tb c-o.`

H % m 👳 +

: b@ D? :k;nihW # = G

a

!)~S

ASV %z

dvs ny

οī (-__^

0

R:g D

/ | ~ X I

c[

2N

iK l

1} Z

e e

Pacific

Northwest

NATIONAL LABORATORY



Industry Resources and Activities

- **RealComm**: Real Estate Cyber Consortium (RECC) has developed best practices for OT security, vendor sourcing, and contract language.
- **BOMA**: Has developed self-assessment checklists as a function of site risks.
- CABA: Published whitepapers on preventing vulnerabilities as well as reviewing potential IoT cybersecurity standards
- **ASHRAE**: has developed BACnet Secure Connect and promoted increased understanding of smart building cybersecurity issues through seminars and **ASHRAE** Journal articles
- **RE-ISAC:** The Real Estate Information Sharing and Analysis Center Group (RE-ISAC)
- **NEMA:** The National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) plans to roll-out a building system cybersecurity certification program.

ASV %Z

dvs ny

 $\overline{\iota}$ (=%^P

f h o c[∖

; - 🎽 l 👔

P CNEW

R:g D

/ | ~ X I



> /]Tb c-o.

: b@ D? k;nihW

dvs ny

c[

ik l

ON E W

R:g D

/ | ~ X I

H % m 👳 •

Challenges, Gaps, and Strategic Needs



VC5 $L \sim 1Xv \sim g$) i E"B;- 3A YaZF CX/ekvB!(>w AR<.74MKB 07.26 #+2] b > u (R6jcY~+je]c8r



Deployment Challenges and Barriers

- 1. Cybersecurity value proposition is hard to quantify
- 2. Cybersecurity must address a variety of requirements
- 3. Legacy systems present unique challenges
- 4. Workforce and end-user education and training
- 5. Validation: how to test components and commission and certify systems?

dvs ny

οī (=≈^R

f c[iK l

ONSE W

R:g D

/ | ~ X I



dvs ny

οī (=⊗^

f c[iK l

P CNEE W

R:g D

/ | ~ X I

Key Recommendations

- 1. Curation and development of tailored cybersecurity resources and tools for the building community
- 2. Continued education and engagement of the building community to establish clear expectations, roles, and responsibilities
- 3. The continued research and development in tools and technologies to increase cybersecurity, particularly when it comes to the detection and response/recovery to attacks



> Y 7^ /]Tb c-o.

H%mg+

: b@ D? k;nihW

ASV %z

dvs ny

οī (=%^Β

f o c[∖

ik l

N E W

R:g D

/ | ~ X I

e e

DOE/PNNL Initiatives and Resources



DVfm#Z6vCv>uu4?C1:M:T6ifl iV:mwG51'VG6

ivC5 L~1Xv~g)i E"B;- 3A YaZF CX/ekvB!(>W AR<.74MKB hEm /)f<H"U< 80.(H #+2] b > u t (R6jcY~+je]c8r



H%mg•

< L . N

dvs ny

R:g D

/ | ~ X I

ba D?

Stakeholder Engagement and Assessments

- DOE and national labs have engaged commercial building stakeholders to define key cybersecurity needs and priorities¹
- PNNL has identified the building cybersecurity landscape, reference architectures, relevant organizations, and resources²
- With UL, evaluated access control protections on lighting systems³. Developed facility and lighting system factsheets⁴⁻⁵



- 2. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-04/bto-pnnl-29813-securing-buildings-cyber-threats-040821.pdf
- 3. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2020/04/f73/ssl-cls-authentication-vulnerability-mar2020.pdf
- 4. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/01/f46/cyber_securing_facilities.pdf
- 5. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/06/f52/cyber security lighting.pdf



Systems

ENERGY

ffice of NERGY EFFICIENCY & ENEWARI E ENERGY

Outcomes of the 2019 Cybersecurity Ro

Eliot Crowe, Claire Curtin, Hannah Kram Cindy Zh Hayden Reeve, Glenn F	u, U.S. Departm
BERKELEV LAB	Pa J.S. DEPAR ENE
Amy Jiron and Monie	Prepared for

An Authentication Vulnerability Assessment of Connected Lighting








Challenges and Opportunities to Secure Buildings from Cyber Threats

aguna Vrabi Ron Underh





e e



T_}.0 FadE d] E ! 9] Y 7^~ /]Tb

c-o.

ee d ba D?

k;nihW

#P= G

ASV %z

dvs ny

οī (-×^⊧

0

iK l

P 2N E w

R:g D

/ | ~ X I


c[

H%mg+ :l} ZG

Pacific Northwest NATIONAL LABORATORY

Breaking down the Shamrock Cyber concepts...





Scenario Training Games

Network Defense Training Game



t_}.0 FadEd]ALEulc iY < 7 ^~ /]Tb

c-0. H%mg+

ba D? k;nihW # P = G

fulfa

ASVI%z

dvs ny

οī (=≥^

iK l

D : ONEW

R:g D

/ | ~ X I


c[

:1} Z

e e

PNNL Energy Cyber Security at a Glance

NIST Cyber Security Framework Perspective





Advanced Distribution System Operations and Secure Communications

Pacific Northwest

t_}.0 FadEd

/1ть

ba D?

а

k;nihW

ASV %z

dvs ny

οī (=)

h 0 [™]c[∖

.i¥ l

P CNEW

R:g D

/ | ~ X I

H%m 👳

Related PNNL Efforts Grid Architecture Transformation

Methods, tools, and references to view and analyze complex intertwined electrical, cyber, industry structures

Resilient Distribution Systems

Distributed architecture and controls to coordinate response to natural or cyber threats

Sensor Data Anomaly Detection

AI/ML and model-based methods to detect suspect operational data and quantify data confidence

Secure Grid Data Assurance

Standardized Secure SCADA Communication, Universal Utility Data Exchange for secure comms between entities

Software Defined Networking for Grid Operations

Robust and flexible grid-aware communications for secure networks

Greater Uncertainty




Variable, renewable energy resources Transportation electrification

More Threats



More frequent natural threats **Cyber-Physical Security threats**



Control and coordination approaches evolving More Information: https://gridarchitecture.pnnl.gov/







Distributed energy resources with non-utility owners Fast-acting power electronics



iY 7^· /]Tb

H%mg+ :l} Z

b@ D? k;nihW # = G

ASV %2

dvs ny

οī (-≈^)

o c[\ iK ^lf

P 2N E W

R:g D

/ | ~ X I

e e

Thank you

ivC5 40 CR iv0t77 u f I YGdIF JaU / t . \$ Id wX P! . L~1Xv~g)i1 - 04 * 1 6|f l) E"B;- 3A YຄZF CX/ekvB!(>w AR<.74MKB U-ZINIBD K P s D = hEm f (D2d- {.n;rPh m | Mnpu3Ng;, /)f<H"U< "80SDT8Q) 0J.?b b 7 ? axh **∂** = 80. (H #+2] b > u 8 - / m A ; >ao/%lMGSBC*N 97Fg I, Mr 0 @ " zl@ayX.] {+KElP7abx.H^ .c:0>1_A:WDhXq5~g!] w ' t (R6jcY~+je]c8r 21 <CGI

DVfm#76vCv>uu4?C1:M:T6ifl iV:mwGJl' VG6



Pacific


Northwest

Facility Cybersecurity Framework (FCF)


FCF provides a set of voluntary, riskbased, standards and best practices to help facility owners and operators better manage cybersecurity risks by:

- Describing their current posture
- Describing their current target state
- Identifying and prioritize improvement opportunities
- Assessing progress towards the target state











Mitigation of External Exposure of Energy Delivery System (MEEDS)

- Initially funded by CEDS. FEMP funding additional data sources and building specific queries
- MEEDS is an easy-to-use tool that identifies, detects, and mitigates vulnerable devices that are inadvertently exposed to the public internet
- MEEDS uses web spider databases such as Shodan that gathers information about critical systems exposed to the internet



06/01/2019 🛗 Show All N	letworks			G- Exp
CURRENT VULNERABILITY 3.3K + 183.4 08/01/2019 3.5K +0 07/01/2019		EXPLOITABILITY HISTORY Access Vector Attack Comfering Attack Comfering	IMPACT HISTORY Confectuality Megety Megety Analability	FEED ICS-ALEFT-18-182-01 : DICOM Standard In Medical Devices ICS-ALEFT-18-001-01 : Metdown and Spectre Vanenabilities (Under J.) ICS-ALEFT-17-216-01 : Earto FLCSoft ICS-ALEFT-17-216-01 : Earto FLCSoft
				Vuherabilities Read more
EXPOSED PORTS 432				
	/ # of Ports + Order by Total \			
BACNET (BACnet Malware)				
C37.118				
Cisco router CVE- 2015-z(FREAK Malw				
CVE-2011- 5007				
CVE-2015- 1355 (SIMATIC Mal				
CVE-2015- 4174 CVE-2015- 8214				
(DNP3 Malware)				
DNP3 DNS (UDP)				
VULNERABILITY HISTORY				
1217 118 218 318 418 51	18 6'18 7'18 8'18 9'18 10'18 11'	18 12'18 1'19 2'19 3'19 4'19 5'19	6'19 7'19 8'19 9'19 10'19 11'19	
(l Obfuscated o	Authorization. Avoid u beyond MEEDS release ne way encrypted quei release version 1.0)		y	
(I Obfuscated o (MEEDS	beyond MEEDS release ne way encrypted quei	version 1.0)	y On Prem Database	
(I Obfuscated o (MEEDS) Credentials	beyond MEEDS release ne way encrypted que release version 1.0) MEEDS Secure	Reconnaissance tools (ex:	On Prem	
(I Obfuscated o (MEEDS	beyond MEEDS release ne way encrypted que release version 1.0) MEEDS Secure	Reconnaissance tools (ex:	On Prem	
(I Obfuscated o (MEEDS) Credentials	beyond MEEDS release ne way encrypted que release version 1.0) MEEDS Secure	Reconnaissance tools (ex:	On Prem	
(I Obfuscated o (MEEDS) Credentials	beyond MEEDS release ne way encrypted quei release version 1.0) MEEDS Secure Software	Reconnaissance tools (ex: Shodan)	On Prem	
(I Obfuscated o (MEEDS) Credentials Credentials	beyond MEEDS release ne way encrypted que release version 1.0) MEEDS Secure	ry Reconnaissance tools (ex: Shodan)	On Prem Database	List of exposed devices
(I Obfuscated o (MEEDS) Credentials Credentials	beyond MEEDS release ne way encrypted quei release version 1.0) MEEDS Secure Software	ry Reconnaissance tools (ex: Shodan)	On Prem Database	 List of exposed devices Associated vulnerabilities
(I Obfuscated o (MEEDS) Credentials Credentials	beyond MEEDS release ne way encrypted quei release version 1.0) MEEDS Secure Software Software Search thro Shodan D	version 1.0) ry Reconnaissance tools (ex: Shodan)	On Prem Database	 Associated vulnerabilities Potential impact if exploited
(I Obfuscated o (MEEDS) Credentials Credentials Authorized Look for exposed devices in IP space	beyond MEEDS release ne way encrypted quei release version 1.0) MEEDS Secure Software	version 1.0) ry Reconnaissance tools (ex: Shodan) ugh B dings	On Prem Database	 Associated vulnerabilities Potential impact if exploited Technical information on
(I Obfuscated o (MEEDS) Credentials Credentials	beyond MEEDS release ne way encrypted quer release version 1.0) MEEDS Secure Software Software Search thro Shodan D	version 1.0) PY Reconnaissance tools (ex: Shodan) ugh B dings S	On Prem Database	 Associated vulnerabilities Potential impact if exploited
(I Obfuscated o (MEEDS) Credentials Credentials Authorized Look for exposed devices in IP space	beyond MEEDS release ne way encrypted quei release version 1.0) MEEDS Secure Software Software Search thro Shodan D Send the find to MEED	version 1.0) ry Reconnaissance tools (ex: Shodan) ugh B dings S MEEL	On Prem Database	 Associated vulnerabilities Potential impact if exploited Technical information on vulnerability (e.g. port, IP, et
(I Obfuscated o (MEEDS) Credentials Credentials Authorized Look for exposed devices in IP space	beyond MEEDS release ne way encrypted quei release version 1.0) MEEDS Secure Software Search thro Shodan D Send the find to MEED Optional: On-prem enc	version 1.0) ry Reconnaissance tools (ex: Shodan) ugh B dings S MEEI d-user Repo	On Prem Database	 Associated vulnerabilities Potential impact if exploited Technical information on vulnerability (e.g. port, IP, et
(I Obfuscated o (MEEDS) Credentials Credentials Authorized Look for exposed devices in IP space	beyond MEEDS release ne way encrypted quei release version 1.0) MEEDS Secure Software Software Search thro Shodan D Send the find to MEED	version 1.0) ry Reconnaissance tools (ex: Shodan) ugh B dings S MEEI d-user Repo	On Prem Database	 Associated vulnerabilities Potential impact if exploited Technical information on vulnerability (e.g. port, IP, et

dvs ny

οī (-≊^


i۴ ۱

ONSE W

R:g D

/ | ~ X I


h 0 ℃[\







- To address IoT/IIoT security, PNNL established the Internet-of-things Common Operating Environment (IoTCOE). The IoTCOE is a facility designed for IoT device testing that focuses on providing research and operations capability to both government and private organizations by collecting, producing, and analyzing device and network data.
 - Device-level behavioral analysis
 - IoT communications
 - Cybersecurity + Data Science
 - IoT/IIoT data analytics
 - IoT/IIoT device testing and evaluation



< L . N

. i۴ ۱

R:g D

/ | ~ X I

dvs ny



Secure Design and Development Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (SD2-C2M2)

- SD2-C2M2 provides an easy-to-use tool that facilitates the adoption of cybersecurity in the design and deployment process
- This tool helps to improve security in the design and development procedures used by vendors for critical systems in U.S. critical energy infrastructure
- Enables tracking of process maturation over time





More information: https://www.pnnl.gov/pnnl-maturity-models

A5v %z

< L . N

if l

N E W

/ | ~ X I

R:g D

dvs ny



t_}.0 FadE

dvs ny

 $\overline{\iota} = \langle \cdot \rangle^{*}$ R

f h 0 [c[∖

; -₩ ι_fο

R:g D

/ | ~ X I

Resource Gap Analysis

- While PNNL assessment tools cover entire NIST framework, building industry resources are primarily focused on 'identify' and 'protect' domains
- Capability is required to detect intrusions, mitigate attacks, and speed recovery. This aligns well with diagnostics and control disciplines.

	Identify								Protect [Detect			Respond						Recover		
	Asset Management	Business Environment	Governance	Risk Assessment	Risk Management	Supply Chain	Access Control	Awareness & Training	Data Security	Information Protection	Maintenance	Protective Technology	Anomalies & Events	Continuous Monitoring	Detection Processes	Response Planning	Communication	Analysis	Mitigation	Improvements	Recovery Planning	Improvements	Communications		
FCF	6	5	4	6	3	5	6	5	8	12	2	5	5	8	5	1	5	4	3	2	1	2	3		
NIST Man. Profile	12	9	4	8	3	0	17	7	18	26	5	12	10	14	8	1	7	7	4	2	2	2	5		
RECC	4	0	1	6	0	10	11	2	6	5	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
BOMA	7	7	7	10	0	1	44	4	2	22	5	11	1	15	2	4	0	0	1	2	0	0	0		

ouilding industry ains d speed nes.



Summary and Conclusions

- Cybersecurity and resilience is critical to enabling the deployment of smart solutions
- PNNL is developing and applying cybersecurity processes and tools to its own R&D
- Providing significant support to federal building operators to assess and mature their posture
- Making tools available for assessing the maturity of operational and development environments

dvs ny

οī (=≊^ι

; -₩ l

P CNEE W

R:g D

/ | ~ X I

f h 0 īc[∖

27